Wedekind, C.; Milinski, M. (1996). "Human Cooperation in the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma: Pavlov versus Generous Tit-for-tat". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 93 (7): 2686–2689. Bibcode:1996PNAS...93.2686W. doi:10.1073/pnas.93.7.2686. PMC 39691. PMID 11607644.

In "Human Cooperation in the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma: Pavlov versus Generous Tit-for-tat" (1996), Claus Wedekind and Manfred Milinski investigate the effectiveness of different strategies for cooperation in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. The authors compare the performance of Pavlov, a strategy that cooperates when the opponent's previous action matches its own and defects otherwise, and Generous Tit-for-tat, a strategy that cooperates unconditionally in the first round and then cooperates with a certain probability if the opponent defected in the previous round. The study finds that in both simultaneous and alternating versions of the game, Pavlov outperforms Generous Tit-for-tat, leading to greater levels of cooperation and mutual benefit. The research sheds light on the dynamics of human cooperation and the factors that influence the adoption of cooperative strategies. Keywords: Prisoner's Dilemma, Pavlov, Generous Tit-for-tat.